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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Warren Havens and five entities under his control 
brought this suit against competitors Mobex Network 
Services, LLC, Mobex Communications, Inc., Maritime 
Communications/Land Mobile, LLC (MCLM), Paging 
Systems, Inc. (PSI), and Touch Tel Corporation for allegedly 
violating the Federal Communications Act (FCA) and the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.  The District Court dismissed the two 
FCA claims for failure to state a claim.  After a nine-day 
bench trial, the District Court entered judgment for MCLM 
on the basis that no conspiracy existed.  We will affirm. 
 
I. 
A.  FACTS 
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 Marine radio providers enable vessels to communicate 
while on waterways and on the high seas.  An Automated 
Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) station is a 
special type of radio station in the United States that provides 
communication services between land and vessels in 
navigable waterways.  The AMTS spectrum is 217 to 218 
MHz and 219 to 220 MHz.1  Advances in wireless technology 
have greatly expanded the potential uses of AMTS’s, 
including systems for public transportation safety, such as 
“Positive Train Control.”   
 The FCC originally issued licenses to use AMTS-
designated frequencies on a site-based system.  In this system, 
the site is a small geographic region defined by location and 
the waterway served.  These “site-based” licenses were 
provided at no cost on a first-come, first-served basis.  In 
2000, the FCC stopped issuing site-based licenses and began 
issuing AMTS licenses on a geographic basis through a 
competitive bidding process.  Under the new procedure, the 
FCC divided the United States into ten regions and, at two 
public auctions, sold “geographic” licenses for two blocks of 
AMTS frequencies (A block and B block) in each region.  
Both site-based and geographic licensees are subject to 
buildout and service requirements to remain valid.2 
 
 Although geographic licensees may generally place 
stations anywhere within their allotted region, they may not 
interfere with the functioning of existing site-based stations.  
Specifically, 47 C.F.R. § 80.385(b)(1) requires that an 
“AMTS geographic area licensee must locate its stations at 
least 120 kilometers from the stations of co-channel site-
                                              
1 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.106, 30.385. 
2 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.946(c), 1.955(a), 80.49(a)(3). 
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based AMTS licensees” to avoid radio interference with site-
based usage.  In other words, the location of a site-based 
station creates a gap in a geographic licensee’s coverage area 
in which the geographic licensee is barred from transmitting 
on AMTS frequencies.  If a site-based license is terminated, 
revoked, or found invalid, however, the spectrum will revert 
automatically to the geographic licensee.3   
 
 Plaintiffs and defendants are holders of various AMTS 
licenses in the United States.  Out of the twenty geographic 
licenses in the United States that were available at auction, 
plaintiffs obtained thirteen, MCLM obtained four, and PSI 
obtained two.  None of the defendants sought to bid on 
licenses in the same block and region in which the other 
defendants held a pre-existing site-based license.  But 
plaintiffs obtained geographic licenses in areas overlaying 
many of Mobex, MCLM, and PSI’s pre-existing site-based 
licenses.  At the center of this dispute is MCLM’s refusal to 
disclose to plaintiffs the location of MCLM’s operating site-
based stations within plaintiffs’ geographic regions.  Unable 
to agree on who should turn over their geographic coordinates 
first, the parties did not exchange information.  This action, 
along with various FCC administrative proceedings, 
followed.  
 
B.  PROCEEDINGS 
 On June 20, 2008, plaintiffs brought claims against 
MCLM, Mobex Network Services, PSI, and Touch Tel.  The 
parties then agreed to dismiss the case without prejudice in 
light of a pending action in California state court.  On 
                                              
3 See id. § 80.385(c). 
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February 18, 2011, Havens filed a Second Amended 
Complaint under a new docket number and added Mobex 
Communications as a defendant.  Plaintiffs assert three claims 
in the Second Amended Complaint.  In Count I, they seek a 
mandatory injunction under § 401(b) of the FCA to force 
defendants to comply with 47 C.F.R. § 80.385 and with the 
directives set out in three FCC documents, which plaintiffs 
refer to as the “Cooperation Orders.”4  Specifically, plaintiffs 
request that the court require defendants to provide plaintiffs 
with the operating contours for their site-based locations that 
are located within plaintiffs’ geographic locations.  In Count 
II, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated § 201(b) of the 
FCA by taking actions that are “unjust and unreasonable” and 
seek monetary damages under §§ 206 and 207.  Plaintiffs also 
allege in Count III that defendants violated § 1 of the 
Sherman Act by conspiring among themselves and with non-
named parties, in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce 
in the AMTS market, as evidenced by defendants’ 
coordination of the purchase of A and B block licenses, their 
agreement to “warehouse” licenses by failing to construct 
site-based stations and by refusing to disclose the operating 
stations’ contours, and their false representations to the 
industry and the FCC.5   
 
                                              
4 We use this term simply to refer to the documents described 
by Plaintiffs, and not to imply that they constitute “orders” 
within the meaning of § 401(b).  See infra Part II.A. 
5 Count III also includes claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act 
based on the “Essential Facilities Doctrine.”  These claims 
were dismissed by the District Court pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) and are not at issue in this appeal.  
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 Plaintiffs attached the three “Cooperation Orders” to 
the Second Amended Complaint.  The first document is an 
April 8, 2009, FCC declaratory ruling in response to 
MCLM’s request for clarification regarding § 80.385(b)(1), in 
which the Commission declared that a geographic licensee’s 
co-channel interference protection obligations should be 
based on actual operating parameters, rather than maximum 
permissible operating parameters.  In a footnote, the FCC 
then stated:  “As we noted in [a prior] decision, we expect 
incumbent AMTS licensees to cooperate with geographic 
licensees in order to avoid and resolve interference issues.  
This includes, at a minimum, providing upon request 
sufficient information to enable geographic licensees to 
calculate the site-based station’s protected contour.”6   
 
 The second Cooperation Order, dated March 20, 2009, 
concerns a marine radio provider’s application to modify its 
AMTS geographic license and PSI’s petition to dismiss the 
application on the basis that the geographic licensee had not 
afforded PSI’s site-based location adequate protection.  In 
dismissing PSI’s petition, the FCC noted that the application 
had to make certain assumptions regarding PSI’s site-based 
location.  In the immediately following footnote, the FCC 
then stated that “AMTS site-based incumbents are expected 
to cooperate with geographic licensees in order to avoid and 
resolve interference issues.  . . . This includes, at a minimum, 
providing upon request sufficient information to enable 
                                              
6 Dennis C. Brown, Esq., Letter, 24 FCC Rcd. 4135, 4136 n.9 
(2009) (Letter) (internal quotations omitted).  
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geographic licensees to calculate the site-based station’s 
protected contour.”7 
 
 The last Cooperation Order is an April 16, 2010, FCC 
denial of reconsideration of its declaratory ruling at issue in 
the first Cooperation Order.  In reaffirming its decision that 
actual parameters should be used for determining co-channel 
interference protection, the FCC observed that “AMTS site-
based licensees are expected to cooperate with geographic 
licensees in avoiding and resolving interference issues, and . . 
. this obligation requires, at a minimum, that the site-based 
licensee ‘provid[e] upon request sufficient information to 
enable geographic licensees to calculate the site-based 
station’s protected contour.’”8  
 
 On December 22, 2011, the District Court dismissed 
plaintiffs’ FCA claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).9  On Count I, the District Court held that 
47 C.F.R. § 80.385 and the Cooperation Orders do not 
constitute “orders” under the meaning of § 401(b) because 
they do not require defendants to engage in any particular 
disclosure of their contour information.  On Count II, the 
                                              
7 In re Applications of Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. to Modify License 
for Station WQEJ718, 24 FCC Rcd. 3310, 3311 n.12 (2009) 
(NUSCO Order). 
8 In re Maritime Commc’ns/Land Mobile, LLC Warren 
Havens, Envtl. LLC, Intelligent Transp. & Monitoring LLC, 
Skybridge Spectrum Found., 25 FCC Rcd. 3805, 3807 ¶ 6 
(2010) (Reconsideration Order) (quoting Letter, 24 FCC Rcd. 
at 4136 n.9). 
9 See Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC, No. 11-993, 
2011 WL 6826104 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2011). 
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District Court held that the FCC had not yet addressed 
whether the precise type of conduct at issue here was “unjust 
or unreasonable” and therefore plaintiffs had no private right 
of action under §§ 206 and 207.   
 
 MCLM subsequently moved for summary judgment 
on the remaining claim.  Plaintiffs sought to reopen discovery 
pursuant to Rule 56(d).  At this point, the other defendants 
had stopped actively litigating the case.  Mobex had become 
defunct and had had default entered against it in February 
2013; PSI and Touch Tel entered into a settlement agreement 
with plaintiffs on April 8, 2013.  On March 20, 2014, the 
District Court denied both MCLM’s motion for summary 
judgment and plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion. 
 The bench trial began on May 20, 2014, and proved 
contentious.  Prior to trial, plaintiffs sought to admit 6,500 
trial exhibits but then revised the list to 522 exhibits, and 
were eventually ordered to limit the list further.  Six witnesses 
testified, including two plaintiffs’ experts who described 
advances in accident avoidance in railroad transportation.  
Warren Havens also testified on behalf of all plaintiffs.  
Additional witnesses were Sandra DePriest, MCLM founder; 
Donald DePriest, her husband and a communications 
businessman; and John Reardon, former Mobex 
Communications president, CEO, and general counsel.  The 
parties also submitted excerpts of deposition testimony of 
David Kling, a Touch Tel engineer; David Predmore, a 
former Mobex Communications and Mobex Network in-
house attorney; and Robert Cooper, Touch Tel’s president.  
The nine-day bench trial concluded on June 10, 2014.   
 
 Almost a month after the parties had submitted 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, plaintiffs 
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wrote to the District Court to appraise it of “certain new and 
material information.”  Plaintiffs attached MCLM’s responses 
to interrogatories served by the FCC, in which MCLM stated 
that it had abandoned many of its sites prior to May 12, 2012, 
and December 2, 2013.  Plaintiffs claim that, had MCLM 
disclosed this previously, plaintiffs would have been 
significantly less hindered in their build-out plans for their 
geographic stations.  According to plaintiffs, “the only 
credible reason for MCLM not so advising plaintiffs was to 
uphold, and keep hidden, MCLM’s contribution to its 
antitrust conspiracy with PSI.”   
 
 On September 2, 2014, the District Court found in 
favor of MCLM on the basis that plaintiffs had failed to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy 
existed.10  “Put another way, were the Court as factfinder 
presented with [this] question in a typical verdict sheet given 
to the jury in a Sherman Act § 1 case, . . . the Court would 
answer, easily, No.”11  Because plaintiffs lost on the merits, 
the court dismissed the default judgment against Mobex as 
well. 
 
II.12 
                                              
10 See Havens v. Maritime Commc’ns/Land Mobile, LLC, No. 
11-993, 2014 WL 4352300 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2014). 
11 Id. at *30. 
12 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and we exercise jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  See Farber v. City of 
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A.  PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FCC ORDERS 
 Section 401(b) of the FCA gives private individuals an 
express right to enforce FCC “orders.”  This provision 
authorizes injunctive relief for any party injured where 
another party “fails or neglects to obey any order of the 
Commission other than for the payment of money.”13  
Plaintiffs seek a court order directing MCLM to provide them 
with contour information for its site-based AMTS stations.  
However, plaintiffs are entitled to a remedy only if the 
provisions of 47 C.F.R. § 80.385(b)(1) or the so-called 
Cooperation Orders constitute “orders” within the meaning of 
§ 401(b). 
 
 We previously addressed the definition of an “order” 
under § 401(b) in Mallenbaum v. Adelphia Communications 
Corp.14  There, the plaintiffs challenged Adelphia’s monthly 
                                                                                                     
Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006).  “A motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted only if, 
accepting all well pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, 
and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief.”  In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997).  “We 
review the District Court’s factual finding from the non-jury 
trial under a clearly erroneous standard . . ..”  Gordon v. 
Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 201 (3d Cir. 2005).  When 
we are confronted with mixed questions of law and fact, 
however, “we apply the clearly erroneous standard except that 
the District Court’s choice and interpretation of legal precepts 
remain subject to plenary review.”  Id.  
13 47 U.S.C. § 401(b). 
14 74 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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fee to cable subscribers who received programming on more 
than one television set.  The monthly fee was based on 47 
C.F.R. § 76.923, which requires that charges for multiple 
outlets be based on actual cost.15  In analyzing whether the 
plaintiffs had an express right of action under § 401(b), we 
began by considering the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States.16  
Although CBS interpreted a different provision of the FCA, 
we identified from it the general principle that “an agency 
regulation should be considered an ‘order’ if it requires a 
defendant to take concrete actions.”17  We then outlined the 
circuit split in applying this principle,18 but declined to 
                                              
15 Id. at 467. 
16 316 U.S. 407 (1942). 
17 Mallenbaum, 74 F.3d at 468 (citing CBS, 316 U.S. at 416-
25). 
18 Currently, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits expressly or implicitly hold that “order” encompasses 
both FCC adjudicatory and rulemaking orders, see 
Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. 
OpenBand at Lansdowne, LLC, 713 F.3d 187, 200-01 (4th 
Cir. 2013); Alltel Tenn., Inc. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 913 
F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1990); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 827 F.2d 1264, 1271 (9th Cir. 1987); Ill. Bell 
Tel., Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 740 F.2d 566, 571 (7th 
Cir. 1984); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
744 F.2d 1107, 1115-19 (5th Cir. 1984), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds by 476 U.S. 1166 (1986), 
whereas, the First Circuit requires that an “order” be judicial 
in nature, see New England Tele. and Tele. Co. v. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, 742 F.2d 1, 4-8 (1st Cir. 1984).  Much of this 
disagreement stems from the question of whether a court 
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choose between the two approaches because the plaintiffs lost 
under either test.19  Specifically, 47 C.F.R. § 76.923 does not 
order cable operators to charge specific rates; rather, it offers 
“guidelines to be followed by local franchising authorities” 
and “[did] not itself require particular actions to be taken by 
defendant Adelphia.”20 
 As in Mallenbaum, we will not adopt either approach 
to defining “order” under § 401(b) because 47 C.F.R. § 
80.385(b)(1) and the Cooperation Orders fail under both 
standards.  For its part, § 80.385 does not address a site-based 
licensee’s duty to provide contour information.  In fact, it is 
focused solely on the obligation of a geographic licensee to 
protect the site-based licensee’s rights by adhering to certain 
requirements, and imposes no obligations on site-based 
licensees.21  While the rule may “presuppose” that a site-
based licensee will provide a geographic licensee its 
coordinates to safeguard its own interests, such an assumption 
cannot form the basis of an enforceable “order” under § 
                                                                                                     
should rely on the Administrative Procedure Act’s definition 
of “order,” which is limited to “a final disposition . . . in a 
matter other than rule making.”  See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6). 
19 Mallenbaum, 74 F.3d at 468 n.5 (“We need not choose 
between the First Circuit and Ninth Circuit approaches, for, 
even assuming arguendo that some rules may be considered 
orders under § 401(b), the FCC rule at issue here may not.”). 
20 Id. at 469.   
21 47 C.F.R. § 80.385(b)(1) (“[E]ach AMTS geographic area 
licensee may place stations anywhere within its region 
without obtaining prior Commission approval provided:  
(1) The AMTS geographic area licensee must locate its 
stations at least 120 kilometers from the stations of co-
channel site-based AMTS licensees . . ..”). 
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401(b).  Since 47 C.F.R. § 80.385(b)(1) imposes no duties on 
MCLM, it does not afford plaintiffs a remedy.22 
 
 Similarly, the Cooperation Orders do not impose any 
obligations on MCLM.  Most of the language highlighted by 
plaintiffs describes the FCC’s mere expectation that site-
based and geographic licensees will cooperate with one 
another.23  This makes sense considering that the documents 
were not intended to address a site-based licensee’s 
obligations.  Like § 80.385, the Cooperation Orders describe 
a geographic licensee’s duty to a site-based licensee:  the first 
and third documents provide the procedure for determining 
the necessary level of interference protection and the second 
document resolves a dispute concerning interference.  Only in 
dicta—indeed, relegated mostly to footnotes—did the FCC 
describe any duty owed by site-based licensees.  We do not 
view this language as creating any binding or enforceable 
requirement under § 401(b).   
 
                                              
22 See Mallenbaum, 74 F.3d at 469; see generally CBS, 316 
U.S. at 416-25. 
23 See, e.g., Letter, 24 FCC Rcd. at 4136 n.9 (“[W]e expect 
incumbent AMTS licensees to cooperate with geographic 
licensees in order to avoid and resolve interference issues.” 
(internal quotations omitted)); NUSCO Order, 24 FCC Rcd. 
at 3311 n.12 (“AMTS site-based incumbents are expected to 
cooperate with geographic licensees in order to avoid and 
resolve interference issues.”); Reconsideration Order, 25 
FCC Rcd. at 3807 ¶ 6 (“AMTS site-based licensees are 
expected to cooperate with geographic licensees in avoiding 
and resolving interference issues . . ..”).   
15 
 
 Furthermore, even if the Cooperation Orders require 
MCLM to take some action, that action is not sufficiently 
concrete.  The FCC requested that site-based licensees, “at a 
minimum, provid[e] upon request sufficient information to 
enable geographic licensees to calculate the site-based 
station’s protected contour.”24  This language says nothing 
about how any alleged obligation should be undertaken:  
When, and in what matter, must the information be provided?  
In fact, the FCC described cooperation as needed “in order to 
avoid and resolve interference issues,”25 implying that 
disclosure of contour information may occur only after an 
interference issue arises.   
 
 We therefore reiterate that vague statements by the 
FCC, particularly when made in dictum, cannot form the 
basis of an “order” under § 401(b).  Because neither 47 
C.F.R. § 80.385(b)(1) nor the so-called Cooperation Orders 
constitute an “order,” we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of Count I. 
                                              
24 Letter, 24 FCC Rcd. at 4136 n.9; NUSCO Order, 24 FCC 
Rcd. at 3311 n.12; see Reconsideration Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 
at 3807 ¶ 6.   
25 Letter, 24 FCC Rcd. at 4136 n.9; NUSCO Order, 24 FCC 
Rcd. at 3311 n.12; see Reconsideration Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 
at 3807 ¶ 6; see also In re Amendment of the Commission’s 
Rules Concerning Maritime Communications, Second 
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Fifth Report and 
Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 6685, 6704 ¶ 39 (2002) (“In instances 
where interference occurs, we will expect the licensees to 
coordinate among themselves to minimize such interference 
and to cooperate to resolve any interference problems that 
may arise.”). 
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B.  PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 207. 
 Under 47 U.S.C. § 207, any person damaged by a 
common carrier may either make a complaint to the FCC or 
sue in district court for “the recovery of the damages for 
which such common carrier may be liable under the 
provisions of this chapter.”  Common carriers, such as 
MCLM, are liable if they “do, or cause or permit to be done, 
any act, matter, or thing in this chapter prohibited or declared 
to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in 
this chapter required to be done.”26  Plaintiffs claim that 
MCLM violated § 201(b), which declares that all practices in 
connection with common carrier service shall be “just and 
reasonable” and that any “unjust or unreasonable [practice] is 
declared to be unlawful.”27   
 
 A plaintiff is not entitled to a cause of action under § 
207 simply on the basis of its own determination that conduct 
was “unjust or unreasonable.”  In Global Crossing 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones 
Telecommunications, Inc., the Supreme Court considered 
whether a payphone operator could bring a federal claim 
under § 207 on the basis of the FCC’s determination that “a 
carrier’s refusal to pay the compensation ordered amounts to 
an ‘unreasonable practice’ within the terms of § 201(b).”28  
                                              
26 47 U.S.C. § 206.  
27 Plaintiffs identify many other FCC rules and orders that 
Defendants allegedly violated, but they confine their appeal to 
the question of whether the conduct underlying these 
violations was “unjust or unreasonable” under § 201(b).   
28 550 U.S. 47, 52 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 
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The Court held that a private lawsuit is proper under § 207 
only “if the FCC could properly hold that a carrier’s failure to 
pay compensation is an ‘unreasonable practice’ deemed 
‘unlawful’ under § 201(b).”29  Here, plaintiffs do not rely on 
any regulation determining that the particular type of actions 
taken by MCLM were “unjust or unreasonable” under the 
meaning of § 201(b).  Instead, plaintiffs assert that such a 
finding is unnecessary based on the FCA’s grant of a broad 
private remedy and “the Supreme Court’s intentional use of 
the phrase ‘could properly hold’ instead of ‘did properly 
hold’” in Global Crossing.30  We do not agree.   
 In creating § 201(b), Congress “delegated to the 
agency authority to ‘fill’ a ‘gap,’ i.e., to apply § 201 through 
regulations and orders with the force of law.”31  Although 
§ 201(b)’s language is certainly broad, its purpose is to 
empower the FCC to declare unlawful certain common carrier 
practices.32  Nothing in the statute implies that violations of 
                                              
29 Id. at 52-53. 
30 See Pls.’ Br. at 55-57 (emphasis added in brief). 
31 Global Crossing, 550 U.S. at 57; see Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
980-81 (2005) (“[Section 201(b)] give[s] the Commission the 
authority to promulgate binding legal rules . . ..”). 
32 See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“All charges, practices, 
classifications, and regulations for and in connection with 
such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and 
any such charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is 
unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful. . . . 
Provided, That communications by wire or radio subject to 
this chapter may be classified . . . as the Commission may 
decide to be just and reasonable . . .. The Commission may 
prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in 
18 
 
all FCC regulations amount to unjust or unreasonable 
practices, and plaintiffs point to no authority supporting such 
an interpretation.  Furthermore, adopting plaintiffs’ approach 
would “put interpretation of a finely-tuned regulatory scheme 
squarely in the hands of private parties and some 700 federal 
district judges, instead of in the hands of the Commission.”33  
It strains reason to believe that Congress intended such a 
result.  A more common sense reading of the statute is that 
the FCC must first determine that a particular type of practice 
constitutes an “unjust or unreasonable” practice under § 
201(b) before a plaintiff may bring a cause of action under § 
207 on the basis of that conduct.    
 
 Although Global Crossing did not state that there must 
be an FCC ruling deeming the conduct at issue “unjust or 
unreasonable,” an FCC determination was critical to its 
analysis.  The Court first noted that “the FCC has long 
implemented § 201(b) through the issuance of rules and 
regulations.”34  It then considered the more “difficult 
question” of “whether the particular FCC regulation . . . 
lawfully implements § 201(b)’s ‘unreasonable practice’ 
prohibition.”35  Applying the Chevron framework, the Court 
held that the FCC properly implemented § 201(b) due to its 
reasonable determination that failure to abide by its rate 
                                                                                                     
the public interest to carry out the provisions of this 
chapter.”). 
33 N. Cnty. Comm’ns Corp. v. Cal. Catalog & Tech., 594 F.3d 
1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). 
34 Global Crossing, 550 U.S. at 53.  
35 Id. at 54-55. 
19 
 
determinations was an unjust or unreasonable action.36  In 
other words, the question of lawful implementation was 
premised on there being an FCC finding in the first place.  
Moreover, the Court carefully limited its holding by stating 
that not “every violation of FCC regulations is an unjust and 
unreasonable practice.”37  Although the Court used the phrase 
“if the FCC could properly hold” instead of “if the FCC did 
properly hold,” its emphasis in the sentence—and throughout 
the opinion—was on “if” the FCC’s determination was 
proper.38  We therefore do not agree that, by using one turn of 
phrase, the Court sanctioned such an expansive reading of the 
FCA. 
 
 We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Count 
II because plaintiffs do not identify any particular actions 
taken by MCLM that have been determined by the FCC to be 
unreasonable or unjust.  Therefore,  plaintiffs do not possess a 
private right of action under § 207.39 
                                              
36 Id. at 55-57; see id. at 60 (“[T]he FCC properly implements 
§ 201(b) when it reasonably finds that the failure to follow a 
Commission, e.g., rate or rate-division determination made 
under a different statutory provision is unjust or unreasonable 
under § 201(b).”). 
37 Id. at 56.   
38 See id. at 53 (“Insofar as the statute’s language is 
concerned, to violate a regulation that lawfully implements § 
201(b)’s requirements is to violate the statute.”). 
39 The FCC need not have declared a particular defendant’s 
actions unreasonable in a prior adjudication.  In Demmick v. 
Cellco Partnership, Verizon argued that claims under § 
201(b), prior to being filed in federal court, “must be brought 
to the Federal Communications Commission . . . for a 
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C.  CONCERTED ACTION. 
 
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to 
be illegal.”40  “The existence of an agreement is the hallmark 
of a Section 1 claim.”41  For liability under § 1 to exist, there 
must be a “unity of purpose or a common design and 
understanding or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful 
arrangement.”42  This can be shown by putting forth direct 
evidence of concerted action, such as “a document or 
conversation explicitly manifesting the existence of the 
agreement in question,”43 or circumstantial evidence of 
                                                                                                     
determination regarding the reasonableness of the challenged 
conduct.”  No. 06-2163, 2011 WL 1253733, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 29, 2011).  The court rejected this argument based, in 
part, on the fact that there was no prior adjudication in Global 
Crossing.  Id. at *4-5.  But, in Global Crossing, the FCC 
announced through general rulemaking that a particular type 
of practice was unjust or unreasonable.  This, too, is all our 
holding today requires in order to maintain a cause of action.  
40 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
41 In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 117 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
42 Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 
999 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). 
43 See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 324 
n.23 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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conscious parallel conduct and other “plus factors.”44  The 
term “plus factors” refers to circumstances demonstrating that 
the wrongful conduct “was conscious and not the result of 
independent business decisions of the competitors.”45 
 
 Plaintiffs’ direct evidence of concerted action at trial 
was an alleged agreement that was reached during a 
conversation over twenty-five years ago between Touch Tel’s 
president Cooper and a businessman named Fred Daniel.  
Daniel is the founder of Regionet, a marine radio provider 
that was later acquired by Mobex.  According to plaintiffs, 
Cooper and Daniel agreed to split up the market for 
geographic licenses, whereby Regionet would only bid on A 
block licenses and PSI and Touch Tel would only bid on B 
block licenses.  Plaintiffs further alleged that knowledge of 
this conspiracy passed to Mobex employees after Regionet 
was acquired in 2000, and then to MCLM after it purchased 
Mobex’s licenses in 2005.  Plaintiffs also sought to prove the 
existence of concerted action by virtue of certain plus factors, 
including that defendants refused to provide contour 
information, did not construct or operate their stations, and 
took actions not in their individual economic interests. 
 
 On appeal, plaintiffs mainly quibble with the District 
Court’s conclusion that no agreement existed.  Notably absent 
from this discussion is any recitation or application of the 
clearly erroneous standard of review, which must guide our 
analysis.  A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is 
“completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support 
                                              
44 See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 & 
n.11 (3d Cir. 2004). 
45 Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122. 
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displaying some hue of credibility or bears no rational 
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”46  In an 
extensive 59-page opinion, the District Court examined all of 
the evidence and provided more than ample support for its 
conclusion that no concerted action existed.  The District 
Court first found that Daniel and Cooper’s early conversation 
illustrated only “a course of action that Daniel and his 
company intended to take, which arguably warned Cooper off 
of pursuing the same course” and did not amount to direct 
evidence of market-allocation.47  As to any evidence that such 
an agreement continued, the District Court found the evidence 
speculative, only showing an opportunity for, not the 
existence of, an unlawful agreement.48  Lastly, the District 
Court determined that the alleged plus factors did not amount 
to evidence that a meeting of the minds existed.49  We find no 
clear error in the District Court’s factual findings.   
 
 Plaintiffs argue that the District Court applied an 
improper standard of proof in its treatment of the plus factors.  
Specifically, plaintiffs cite cases in which we found that the 
sharing of confidential information between horizontal 
competitors could indicate that a conspiracy existed.50  But, in 
those cases, we were asked to review a district court’s grant 
of summary judgment, when the facts must be viewed in the 
                                              
46 Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 369 F.3d 745, 754 
(3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
47 Havens, 2014 WL 4352300, at *17. 
48 See id. at *20-22. 
49 See id. at *22-30. 
50 See, e.g., Flat Glass, 385 F.3d 350; Baby Food, 166 F.3d 
122; Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware 
Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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light most favorable to the non-moving party and all 
reasonable inferences must be drawn in that party’s favor.  In 
other words, we held that the sharing of confidential 
information may be evidence of a conspiracy, not that it must 
be.  Here, the District Court properly denied summary 
judgment and allowed the claims to proceed to trial.  At trial, 
the court was then tasked with evaluating the credibility of 
the witnesses and weighing the evidence that plaintiffs 
actually put forth.  The court’s findings were made on this 
basis. 
 
 Plaintiffs claim that the District Court erred further by 
crediting the testimony of MCLM’s key witnesses despite 
plaintiffs’ after-trial submission, which allegedly 
demonstrates that those witnesses lied at trial.  As a 
preliminary matter, plaintiffs do not clarify how the District 
Court should have treated this evidence.  They included no 
formal request for relief in their August 22, 2014, letter, 
seeking only consideration of MCLM’s interrogatory 
responses as additional evidence of conspiracy.  It appears 
that the District Court did just that but was not persuaded.  
And rightfully so:  Rather than offering “new and material” 
information, this submission repeated the same 
unsubstantiated and largely irrelevant arguments plaintiffs 
made at the bench trial.  We therefore find no clear error in 
the District Court’s decision to credit the testimony of 
MCLM’s witnesses.    
 
III.  CONCLUSION. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of Counts I and II pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
and its entry of judgment in favor of MCLM on Count III. 
